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This paper provides a model to consider the conditions under which an acceptance of 
foreign capital is welfare enhancing in a multi-commodity multi-factor framework. 
Contrary to the pessimistic conventional wisdom of capital imports and welfare, we 
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foreign capital to be welfare enhancing is that all domestic factors move into the new 
export sector in equal proportion to the endowments of factors. 
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 11.  Introduction 
As the recent experiences demonstrate, instead of import substitution, many developing 
countries are trying to diversify the industrial structure and making export-led growth by 
accepting foreign capital. In order to consider the implications of these policies, it is 
necessary to provide a model to justify the acceptance of foreign capital.   
The analysis of capital imports and welfare was a hot issue in 1970s and 1980s and 
many seminal papers have been written on this topic. Among them, Bhagwati(1973), 
Brecher and Diaz Alejandro(1977), Brecher and Choudhri(1982), Brecher and 
Findlay(1983), Minabe(1974) and Srinivasan (1983) made important contributions to the 
analyses in this field. Specifically, Brecher and Diaz Alejandro(1977) showed that the 
capital imports under a tariff is immiserizing. In the influential papers in Japanese, 
Uzawa(1969) and Hamada (1971) showed that the capital imports under a tariff is always 
welfare reducing for a small open economy. These papers produced a conventional wisdom: 
the Uzawa-Hamada-Brecher-Diaz Alejandro proposition. Also the welfare effects of a free 
trade zone and export processing zone have attracted considerable attentions and papers 
such as Hamada (1974), Miyagiwa (1986) and Beladi and Marjit(1992) have been written.   
However the conventional wisdom is pessimistic and do not explain the reality of many 
developing countries. Furthermore these previous papers have a limitation in 
dimensionality. These facts motivated us to examine and extend the analyses of capital 
imports and welfare in more general frameworks. The purpose of this paper is to provide a 
model to consider the conditions under which an acceptance of foreign capital is welfare 
enhancing in a multi-dimensional framework. We will provide a sufficient condition for 
welfare enhancing capital imports. 
 2This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we take up the conventional wisdom 
and consider the reasons why such a pessimistic result comes out. The section 3 sets up the 
model of this paper. In section 4, we provide a sufficient condition for welfare enhancing 
capital imports and consider its implications. In section 5, we derive a weaker condition by 
a three-sector, three-factor model which is not only a special case of our model but also an 
extension of Beladi-Marjit(1992). The section 6 concludes the paper. In the appendix, we 
consider why our assumption holds in two cases. 
 
2.  T h e   C o n v e n t i o n a l   W i s d o m                                            
The conventional wisdom, the Uzawa-Hamada-Brecher-Diaz Alejandro proposition, says 
that the capital import under a tariff is welfare reducing. In order to justify our analysis, it 
is necessary to consider the reasons why such a pessimistic result comes out.     
The proposition uses the Heckscher-Ohlin model and it assumes a small open economy 
that imports capital intensive good with a tariff. It also assumes that the foreign capital 
and domestic capital are identical. Assume two commodities   and    that are produced 
by two factors, capital 
1 Y 2 Y
K  and labor  , under the usual neo-classical assumptions. The 
first good is the exportable and labor intensive and the second good is the importable and 
capital intensive;  , where 
L
1 2 k k > j j j L K k / ≡ , 2 , 1 = j . Let the relative price of the second 
good in terms of the first be  p ( 1 2 / p p ≡ ). The first good is the numeraire. Define the 
 function:  max GDP ) , , ( L K p G ≡ [ ] ) , ( ) , ( 2 2 2 1 1 1 L K pY L K Y +  subject to full employment. 
  is homogeneous of degree one and convex in prices and concave in factor supply.    We 
obtain  , , , =
) (⋅ G
p G 2 Y = pK G 0 > pp G 0 > K G r , w GL = , where  r  is the rental of capital and 
 the wage rate. Define the expenditure function:  w ) , ( u p E ≡min[ ] 2 1 pD D +  subject to 
 3u D D U = ) , ( 2 1 , where   is the consumption of  j D j    good and u  the level of utility. 
It is assumed that both goods are normal. 
th
) (⋅ E   is homogeneous of degree one and concave 
in prices and increasing in utility. We obtain  2 D E p = ,  0 < pp E ,  . The quantity 
of import is:  . Let the specific tariff on import and the 
foreign capital be   and    respectively. The budget equation is: 
0 > pu E
= 2 M − ) , ( u p E p ) , , ( L K p Gp
t f K
= ) , ( u p E 2 ) , , ( tM L K p G + f K K L K p G ) , , ( − ,                       ( 1 )  
where   is the tariff revenue and   the repatriation to foreign capital. 
From (1), we obtain: 










− .                                   ( 2 )  
The first term in the numerator in (2) is the tariff revenue effect and the second term the 
repatriation effect. Since    is homogenous of degree one in prices, we have 
. Thus the signs of (2) depend on   and  . First, in the Heckscher- 
) (⋅ E
0 > − pu u tE E pK G KK G
Ohlin model under incomplete specialization, any change in factor supply does not affect 
factor prices. Thus we have  0 = KK G . Second, since the second sector is capital intensive 
and the capital supply increases, we have  . Under these specifications, we obtain 
. This is the conventional wisdom and it says that a capital import under a 
tariff is welfare reducing.   
0 > pK G
f dK du/ 0 <
It is clear that this pessimistic result comes from the models and assumptions. Thus if   
 and  0 < KK G 0 < pK G , an capital import is welfare enhancing. In the seminal paper, 
Jones (1971) has demonstrated that  0 < KK G  in the specific factor model. By the use of a 
specific factor model, Srinivasan (1983) showed that the acceptance of foreign capital could 
be welfare enhancing. The assumption that foreign capital and domestic capital are the 
 4same is also crucial in producing the pessimistic result. If they are the same, an acceptance 
of foreign capital produces  , reduces tariff revenue and welfare. In this paper, we 
provide models where   occurs. 
0 > pK G
0 < pK G
In this connection, it is necessary to take up Beladi and Marjit(1992) which also 
produces a pessimistic result even if two types of capital are assumed. It assumes a 
three-sector (export processing zone, import sector and traditional export sector) 
three-factor (two capitals and one labor) model. It assumes that foreign capital is used only 
in the export processing zone while domestic capital is used in the import and traditional 
export sector but not in the export processing zone. Using such a model, it shows that if the 
economy imports capital intensive good under a tariff an increase in foreign capital 
decreases its welfare. It also shows that an increase in foreign capital increases the output 
of imports and decreases that of exports, making anti-trade growth.
1  
Thus both Heckscher-Ohlin model and Beladi-Marjit model cannot explain the realities 
of many developing countries. We need a model that can justify the acceptance of foreign 
capital. Also we must consider a fact that these countries accept foreign capital in order to 
diversify their industrial structure and attain the export-led growth.  Our models in the 
following sections could achieve these targets. 
2
 
3.   The  Model 
This section sets up our model. Suppose a small open developing country that produces   
commodities  by the use of   factors 
n
) ,..., 1 ( n j = m ) ,..., 1 ( m i =  before the acceptance of 
foreign capital. The multi-dimensionality is a first feature of our model.   
   The production function of each commodity is assumed to be twice-continuously 
 5differentiable, increasing, linearly homogeneous and strictly-quasi-concave in all factors of 
production: 
     ,  ) ,..., , ( 2 1 mj j j
j
j x x x f y = n j ,..., 1 = .                                      ( 3 )  
It is assumed that the m  factors are inelastically supplied and the full employment 
condition holds for each of them: 




,  ,                                                    ( 4 )   m i ,..., 1 =
where  i x  is the domestic supply of      factor. All commodity and factor markets are 
competitive. 
i th
   L e t    be the commodity price vector.  The   function is 
defined: 
) ,..., , ( 2 1 n
T p p p p ≡
3 GDP
       ≡ ) , ( x p F max ,                                        ( 5 )   ) ,..., ( 1 mj j
n
j
j x x f p ∑
1 j=
with respect to   subject to (4), where  ij x ) ,..., 1 , ,..., 1 ( n j m i = = ≡
T x ) ,..., ( 1 m x x  is the 
factor-endowment vector of the economy.   
   Let the new export sector be     sector and suppose that the foreign capital,   
specific to the new export sector, comes into this country and that the new export sector 
starts by accepting this foreign capital and using all existing domestic factors. We assume 
that not only foreign capital but also existing domestic factors are used in the new export 
sector. The assumption that the all existing domestic factors are used in the new export 
sector is the another feature of our model. This could be justified by the following reasons. 
First, if all domestic factors are mobile among sectors of the economy, it is natural that they 
are used in the new export sector. Second, the new export sector cannot be established 
0 th 00 x
 6without the supports of all previous sectors and all previous sectors will support the 
establishment of new export sector. The assumptions that    is specific to the new export 
sector and all existing domestic factors are used in the new export sector are the differences 
between our model and the Heckscher-Ohlin and Beladi-Marjit(1992) model.  
00 x
4
The production function of the new export sector is: 
        ,                                                        ( 6 )   ) , ( 0 00
0
0 x x f y =
where   is the domestic factors used in the new export sector and it has 
 dimension. We assume that this function also satisfies all the standard properties as a 
neo-classical production function. We also assume that the new export good is exported at 
the fixed world price. 
) ,..., ( 0 10 0 m
T x x x ≡
m
Integrating the pre-capital acceptance   function with the production function of 
the 0    sector, we obtain the post-capital acceptance   function: 
GDP
th GDP
      ≡ ) , , , ( 00 0 x x p p G max[ ] ) , ( ) , ( 0 0 00
0
0 x x p F x x f p − +                         ( 7 )    
with respect to  . It is assumed that  0 x ) (⋅ G  is differentiable and concave with respect to 
x  and  . Assuming the existence of the interior solution to this maximization problem, 
we can write the first order condition: 
00 x
      = ) , ( 0 00
0
0 0 x x f p x ) , ( 0 x x p Fx − ,                                             ( 8 )  
where  ≡
T
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(8) shows that the value of marginal product of each existing factor of production is equal 
between the 0   sector and previous sectors. Therefore,   equations in (8) are the  th m
 7profit maximization conditions. Assume that there exists a unique    that satisfies (8).  0 x
    Now, let us turn to the demand side. Denoting the expenditure function of the whole 
residents of the country by    and assuming that the government of this country 
imposes import tariffs and transfers the whole tariff revenue to the residents in a 
lump-sum manner, we can write the budget constraint: 
) , , ( 0 u p p E
       = ) , , ( 0 u p p E + ) , , , ( 00 0 x x p p G [ ] ) , , , ( ) , , ( 00 0 0 x x p p G u p p E p p
T − Γ  
00 00 0 ) , , , (
00 x x x p p Gx − ,                        ( 9 )  
where    is the import tariff vector. We assume that the first   
sectors including the 0   sector are the export sectors and from 
≡ Γ
T ) ,..., , , 0 ,..., 0 ( 2 1 n h h t t t + + h
th 1 + h  to   sector the 
import sectors. It is assumed that there exits no non-traded goods and all goods are normal. 
The second term of the right hand side of (9) is the tariff revenue and the third term the 
repatriation to foreign capital. Since   and 
n
0 p p  are the domestic prices, by denoting the 




      ,  
*
0 0 p p =
  . 
* p p + Γ =
We assume that (9) determines the welfare level    uniquely and it is denoted by  .  u
e u
 
4.  The Analyses 
Now, we derive our main result. The total differentiation of (9) with respect to   and   
yields: 
e u 00 x




u du u p p E u p p E ) , , ( ) , , ( 0 0 Γ −  
00 00 0 ) , , , (
00 dx x x p p Gx = 00 00 0 ) , , , (
00 dx x x p p Gpx
T Γ −  
00 00 0 ) , , , (
00 dx x x p p Gx − 00 00 00 0 ) , , , (
00 00 dx x x x p p G x x −  
 8      [ ] 00 00 00 0 00 0 ) , , , ( ) , , , (
00 00 00 dx x x x p p G x x p p G x x px
T + Γ − = . 
This produces:   




) , , ( ) , , (
) , , , ( ) , , , (
0 0







u p p E u p p E
x x x p p G x x p p G
Γ −
+ Γ
− .                 ( 1 0 )  
The first term in the numerator in (10) is the tariff revenue effect and the second term the 
repatriation effect. We see that they correspond to that in (2). Consider the signs of each 
term. The denominator of (10) is positive. Since the partial derivative of the expenditure 
function with respect to   is linearly homogeneous in   and  u 0 p p , we have the Euler 
condition  , so that 
0 0 up u E p E = up
TE p +
0 0 up u E p E = + up
T E p ) (
* Γ + up
TE Γ > . Thus the 
signs of (10) depend on the numerator. Due to the concavity of the   function with 
respect to 
GDP
x  and  ,  00 x ) , , , ( 00 0 00 00 x x p p G x x 0 ≤ . It is clear that   is the rental rate of 
foreign capital. As the supply of   increases the rental rate declines. This is the 
economic reason why 
00 x G
00 x
) , , , ( 00 0 00 00 x x p p G x x 0 ≤ . Thus what remains to analyze in the 
numerator is the term  ) , , , ( 00 0 00 x x p p Gpx
T Γ .
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Recalling the definition of the    function (7), we see:    GDP
= ) , , , ( 00 0 x x p p Gp ) , ( 0 x x p Fp − .                                     ( 1 1 )  
Therefore, we have: 






x x p Fpx − − .                             ( 1 2 )  






As  ) , ( 0 x x p Fpx −   is the change in the output vector of domestic sectors as the result of an 





 is positive, an 
inflow of foreign capital is welfare enhancing. For this purpose, we introduce a following 
assumption: 






.                  
This assumption implies that all domestic factors move into the new export sector in equal 
proportion to the endowments of factors. When an inflow of foreign capital takes place, it 
attracts the existing factors to the new export sector until the rewards to the existing 
domestic factors is equal between the new export sector and the previous sectors. The 
assumption 1 says that all domestic factors move into the new export sector in equal 
proportion to the endowments of factors.   
        Under this assumption, we see from (12) that  ) , , , ( 00 0 00 x x p p Gpx   is a negative vector, 
which implies that  0 ) , , , ( 00 0 00 < Γ x x p p Gpx
T . From (10), we obtain a following result:   
 
Result 1. An inflow of foreign capital is welfare enhancing under the assumption 1.   
 
The assumption 1 is a sufficient condition for welfare enhancing capital inflow. The 
intuition is as follows. The movement of all domestic factors into the new export sector 
reduces the outputs of all previous sectors including the import sectors. Let the output 
vector of previous sectors be  . Under the assumption 1, we have 
, i.e.,   implies 
) ,..., , ( 2 1 n
T y y y y ≡
00 /dx dy
T 0 < 0 / 00 0 > dx dx 00 /dx dy
T 0 < . This increases the quantity of 
imports, tariff revenue and welfare.   
 10    L e t     be the rental rate of foreign capital. Then we obtain:  0 w
 
Remark 1. By the assumption of differentiability of  ) (⋅ G , there exists a reciprocity relation 
between quantities and prices, i.e.,   implies  .
6  0 / 00 < dx dy
T 0 / 0 <
T dp dw
 
The implications of the remark 1 are as follows. At given foreign capital, suppose that the 
prices of domestic products increase by an increase in tariffs on imports. An increase in the 
prices of domestic products increases the prices of domestic factors, which in turn, at given 
, reduces the rental rate of foreign capital. The reduction of the rental rate of foreign 
capital reduces the repatriations to foreign country and increases the welfare of this 
country.  
0 p
     Let us confirm the differences between the conventional wisdom and our results. In the 
former, it is a two-sector two-factor model, the importable good is capital intensive and 
foreign capital and domestic capital are identical. In such a case, an increase in foreign 
capital increases the output of import and reduces the quantity of import, tariff revenue 
and welfare. In contrast, we assume multi-sectors multi-factors, foreign capital is different 
from domestic one and specific to the new export sector. As the result of the acceptance of 
foreign capital, if all domestic factors move into the new export sector in equal proportion, it 
reduces the outputs of all previous sectors including the import sectors. This increases 
tariff revenue and welfare. In addition, a new export sector is established. 
What remains to consider is the economic justification for the assumption 1. Following 
justifications could be provided. First, the new export sector is a small size of the economy 
or a linear contraction of the economy. Second, if all domestic factors are mobile among 
 11sectors of the economy, it is natural that all of them are used in the new export sector. Third, 
except that a new export sector has been added, this type of factor movement leaves the 
industrial structure unchanged. 
 
5.  Three Sectors Three Factors Model 
In this section, we derive a weaker condition by a three-sector, three-factor model which is 
not only a special case of our model but also an extension of Beladi-Marjit(1992).   
Assume three sectors: sector    is the new export sector, sector 1 the traditional export 
sector and sector 2 the import sector. The new export good is exported at the fixed world 
price and the second good is imported with a tariff. Assume three factors: factor   is the 
foreign capital specific to    sector while factors   and    are the domestic factors used 
in all three sectors. Letting the factor returns to three factors be  , ,  respectively, 
the zero profit condition is: 
0
0 x
0 1 x 2 x
0 w 1 w 2 w
       ,                                                    ( 1 3 )   ) , , ( 2 1 0
0
0 w w w c p =
       ,                                                        ( 1 4 )   ) , ( 2 1
1
1 w w c p =
  .                                                       ( 1 5 )   ) , ( 2 1
2
2 w w c p =
Differentiating these three equations totally assuming    fixed, we obtain:  0 p




































− = ,   ( 1 6 )                      
where  ,  , etc., and  0
0 0
0 / w c c ∂ ∂ ≡ 1
0 0
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From (16), we obtain: 



































































































.                           ( 1 7 )  


















 are the factor intensity of the second factor relative to the first 
factor in the new export sector, traditional export sector and import sector respectively. The 
parenthesis in the denominator of (17) is the difference in the factor intensity between the 
import sector and the traditional export sector. If the import sector is intensive in the 
second factor relative to the traditional export sector, it is positive. On the other hand, the 
parenthesis in numerator of (17) is the differences in the factor intensity between the new 
export sector and the import sector or traditional export sector. We introduce a following 
assumption: 












































Under the assumption 2 with the reciprocity relation, we obtain: 




















.     
The result 2 shows that if the factor intensity in the new export sector lies between the 
two previous sectors an acceptance of foreign capital reduces the outputs of two previous 
sectors, increasing imports, tariff revenue and welfare. The assumption 2 is weaker than 
the assumption 1 because we just require that the factor intensity of the second factor 
relative to the first factor in the new export sector lies between that of other two sectors. We 
do not require that all domestic factors move into the new export sector in equal proportion 
 13to the endowment of factors. If this assumption is satisfied, an acceptance of foreign capital 
reduces the outputs of two previous sectors, increasing tariff revenue and welfare. It should 
be noted that this three-sector three factor model is not only a special case of our model but 
also an extension of Beladi and Marjit (1992).   
7
  
6.   Conclusions 
This paper provided a model to consider the welfare effects of capital imports in a 
multi-dimensional framework and derived a sufficient condition for welfare enhancing 
capital imports. Our result is optimistic and derived under a multi-dimensional framework. 
Our model is based on the assumptions that the foreign capital is different from the 
domestic capital and all domestic factors are used in the new export sector. Under these 
assumptions, we showed that an acceptance of foreign capital not only increases welfare 
but also establishes a new export sector in developing countries. This paper also provided a 
three-sector, three-factor model and derived a weaker condition for welfare enhancing 
capital imports. 
      A number of topics suggest themselves for the further researches. First, the assumption 
1 may be too strong. We provided three economic justifications. A weaker assumption that 
reduces only the outputs of import sectors may be desirable. Also the assumption 1 should 
be examined empirically. Second, the level of technology in the previous sectors may change 
as the result of capital imports and the full repatriation may not be the case. Third, the 
assumptions such as perfect competition, perfect factor mobility and full employment may 
not be suitable for the developing countries. Fourth, the new export good may be consumed 
domestically. If this is the case, an increase in the variety of consumption may increase its 
 14welfare. The generalizations to these aspects are left for the further researches. In spite of 
these facts, contrary to the conventional wisdom, this paper provided a sufficient condition 
to justify the acceptance of foreign capital in a multi-dimensional framework. 
 
Appendix 







                                                           ( a 0 )   
holds in two cases: one is when the number of existing commodity   is equal to that of 
factor    and the other is when they are different.   
n
m
Case 1.    m n =
Denote the cost function of the new export sector by  , where   is  the  output 
of that sector and   is  the    dimensional vector of factor prices which is determined by 
0 0
0 ) , ( y w w c 0 y
w m
  ,    .  = i p ) ,..., ( 1 m
i w w c n i ,..., 1 =
Let    be the solution vector to this system of equations. Using this solution vector, we 
can write 
) (p w
       ,                                                     ( a 1 )   )) ( , ( 0
0
0 p w w c p =
       ,                                                  ( a 2 )   0 0
0
0 00 )) ( , ( y p w w c x =
       .                              ( a 3 )   = 0 x
T





The first equation determines   as   and the rest of equations determine   
and  . Thus we have: 
0 w ) , ( 0 0 p p w 0 y
0 x
       = 0 x
)) ( ), , ( (
0
00









 15Therefore, if the  -dimensional vector  m
        
T





is proportional to  x , so is  , i.e.,  0 x 00 0 x x x α ≈ . In this case we have: 







Case 2.    m n ≠
In this case,   generally depends not only on  ) ( x F w = p  but also on  0 x x − . Thus (a1) - 
(a3) can be rewritten as: 
     )) , ( , ( 0 0
0
0 x x p w w c p − = ,                                               ( a 4 )  
     0 0 0
0
0 00 )) , ( , ( y x x p w w c x − = ,                                             ( a 5 )  
     = 0 x
T




1 − − .          (a6) 
(a4) determines   as  0 w ) , , ( 0 0 0 x x p p w −  for given  , 0 p p  and  0 x x − .Then from (a5), 
we can determine  . By the use of these, (a6) is written as:  0 y
      = 0 x ) , , ( 0 0 00 x x p p H x − ,                                               ( a 7 )  
where  ≡ − ) , , ( 0 0 x x p p H
T
m x x p p H x x p p H )) , , ( ),..., , , ( ( 0 0 0 0 1 − −  
      
T m
x x p w x x p p w c
x x p w x x p p w c
x x p w x x p p w c
x x p w x x p p w c
)
)) , ( ), , , ( (
)) , ( ), , , ( (
,...,
)) , ( ), , , ( (
)) , ( ), , , ( (
(
0
0 0 0 0
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.                
Totally differentiating (a7) with respect to   and  , we obtain:  0 x 00 x
       = 0 dx 00 0 0 ) , , ( dx x x p p H − [ ] 0 0 0 00 ) , , ( dx x x p p H x − ∇ + , 
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.  (a9) 
Since our basic assumption is that the coefficient vector of the new export sector is 
approximately proportional to the endowment vector of the existing factors, i.e., since we 
assume:  
       
T m
x p w x p p w c
x p w x p p w c
x p w x p p w c
x p w x p p w c
)
)) , ( ), , , ( (
)) , ( ), , , ( (
,...,
)) , ( ), , , ( (









0 0 0 0 0 0
x α ≈ . 
we obtain (a0) as: 





x α ≈ . 






1.  The intuitions are as follows. Suppose that the import sector is capital intensive and 
traditional export sector labor intensive. An acceptance of foreign capital attracts labor 
to the export processing zone. This produces a situation where domestic supply of 
capital has increased. By invoking the Rybczynski theorem, we see that the output of 
import sector increases and that of traditional export sector declines. This reduces the 
quantity of import, tariff revenue and welfare. 
2.  On the analysis of industrialization by the acceptance of foreign technology, see Chen 
and Shimomura(1998).     
3.  In what follows, each vector is a column vector. The superscript T  implies the 
transpose of the vector. 
4.  Our models and assumptions originate from the reflections of the analyses of foreign 
direct investment as well as the conventional wisdom. 
5.   =
T








) ,..., , (
2 1
00 00 00
  is considered as a Rybczynski effect. 
6.    See, for example, Chang(1979), p - 712.       
7.    In their model, if the first factor is domestic capital, (13) could be written as    = 0 p
) , ( 2 0
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